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Scholars of the university have produced volumes about growing 
pressures on the coherence and purpose of institutions of higher 
education. Meanwhile, legal scholars’ writing about the university has 
typically focused on its First Amendment dimensions. This Article links 
insights from these two groups of scholars to explore the purpose of the 
university and defend it against increasing technological, ideological, and 
cultural pressures. It argues that a better understanding of the 
relationship between the First Amendment and the university can help 
strengthen the coherence of the university’s purpose against these 
pressures. The connection between the First Amendment and institutional 
purpose is in some ways unsurprising. Limits on expressive liberties have 
always set the boundaries of expression for political communities, and the 
university is a kind of political community. These boundaries reflect 
something about a community’s goals, values, and—ultimately—its 
purpose. 
Part I sets forth a normative framework for the university as what the 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre terms a “place of constrained 
disagreement.” The paradigmatic university under this framework reflects 
three characteristics: it is dialogical, it is democratic, and it is residential. 
Part II builds upon this understanding of the university by considering its 
intersection with five contemporary First Amendment issues: academic 
freedom, public employee speech, public forums, safe spaces, and 




After the Klan and the Neo-Nazis marched in Charlottesville in the summer of 
2017, University of Virginia professor Chad Wellmon lamented his school’s tepid 
response. The university’s president, Teresa Sullivan, had spoken vaguely of 																																																								
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“ideologies and beliefs” that “contradicted our values of diversity, inclusion, and 
mutual respect.”1 Wellmon longed for a more direct rebuke of racism and white 
supremacy, but on reflection, he was not sure that kind of institutional response was 
possible: 
 
The contemporary university, at least in its local form in 
Charlottesville, seems institutionally incapable of moral clarity. Individual 
faculty members had spent the days and weeks before Saturday’s rally 
denouncing and organizing against the white supremacists. But as an 
institution, UVa muddled along through press releases, groping for a voice 
and a clear statement . . . . Sullivan’s missives, especially her initial ones, 
read like press releases from the bowels of a modern bureaucracy, not the 
thoughts of a human responding to hate. 
And that makes a lot of sense. What can the president of a 
contemporary university say? The University of Virginia is many things—
a health center, a federal contractor, a sports franchise, an event venue, 
and, almost incidentally, a university devoted to education and 
knowledge. It is most often, as Clark Kerr wrote in 1963, a multiversity, 
with little common purpose but the perpetuation of itself and its 
procedures. Why should my colleagues and I look to our chief executive 
for moral leadership? As a university president, Sullivan is, in the words 
of Thorstein Veblen, a captain of erudition, not the leader of a community 
bound to a common moral mission.2  
 
Wellmon’s indictment is not limited to his own institution. The question of 
purpose haunts most contemporary universities. Clark Kerr’s 1963 book identified 
a central problem:  
 
A university anywhere can aim no higher than to be as British as 
possible for the sake of the undergraduates, as German as possible for the 
sake of the graduates and the research personnel, as American as possible 
for the sake of the public at large—and as confused as possible for the 
sake of the preservation of the whole uneasy balance.3 
 
The five decades since Kerr’s diagnosis have brought little clarity. Today, 
academic disciplines fracture around ideology and methodology, and they 
increasingly lack the shared linguistic resources even for internal, let alone cross-
																																																								
1 Chad Wellmon, For Moral Clarity, Don’t Look to Universities, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/For-Moral-Clarity-Dont-
Look/240921 [https://perma.cc/86LE-ZPMZ] [hereinafter Wellmon, Moral Clarity].  
2 Id. 
3 CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 14 (5th ed. 2001). 	
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disciplinary, dialogue.4 A renewed wave of campus activism asks university 
administrators to further “social justice,” although the particulars of what that means 
are not always clear.5 In some cases, the pressure to land federal research dollars or 
succeed in big-time athletics compromises the university’s academic mission.6  
Scholars of the university have produced volumes about these and other 
challenges to higher education.7 Meanwhile, legal scholars’ writing about the 																																																								
4 Myra H. Strober, Communicating Across the Academic Divide, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Jan. 2, 2011), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Communicating-Across-
the/125769 [https://perma.cc/2RH3-JTDW] (“Although people outside of universities seem 
to think that faculty members talk to one another across their fields of study . . . substantive 
conversations are infrequent.”). For a compelling account of the growing epistemic divides 
within the discipline of political science, see JOHN GUNNELL, DESCENT OF POLITICAL 
THEORY 1 (1993) (providing a “reconstruction of the hereditary derivation and ancestral 
extraction of the enterprise of academic political theory”).  
5 See, e.g., Allison Stanger, Understanding the Angry Mob at Middlebury that Gave Me 
a Concussion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/opinion 
/understanding-the-angry-mob-that-gave-me-a-concussion.html [https://perma.cc/CLL7-
25LC] (opinion piece by Middlebury College professor injured during protests opposing talk 
by Charles Murray). 
6 See, e.g., Gordon G. Gallup, Jr. & Bruce B. Svare, Hijacked by an External Funding 
Mentality, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 25, 2016) (chronicling the pressures and consequences 
of faculty who pursue federal research dollars); GEORGE FALLIS, MULTIVERSITIES, IDEAS, 
AND DEMOCRACY 56 (2007) (“The magnitude and rapid expansion of U.S. federal 
commitments to university research are, in retrospect, astonishing. From 1953 to 1968, 
federal funding jumped ninefold, adjusted for inflation. That fifteen-year interval has been 
dubbed ‘the golden age’ . . . . Nonetheless, federal commitments continued to expand 
thereafter. In 1980, funding stood at U.S. $4.1 billion and rose to U.S. $13 billion by 1995.”); 
see generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 
(2011) (exploring the effects of collegiate sports on academic and administrative functions); 
Michael Powell, North Carolina’s Dominance Fails to Cover Cheating’s Stain, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/sports/ncaabasketball/north-
carolina-final-four-cheating-fake-classes.html [https://perma.cc/8YRV-H9E9] (“Put simply, 
for two decades until 2013, the university provided fake classes for many hundreds of student 
athletes, most of them basketball and football players.”). 
7 John Henry Newman’s The Idea of the University is perhaps the most well-known 
study of the purpose of the university. JOHN H. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY 
DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED (1852) (writing on the objective duty of the university); see also 
ELLEN CONDLIFFE LANGEMANN, WHAT IS COLLEGE FOR? THE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 9–46 (2012) (commenting on the indifference on matters of the college’s 
purposes); see generally JOHN H. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
(Bradley C.S. Watson ed. 2011) (addressing the relativism on the idea of core curriculum); 
STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (2007) (discussing theology and the characteristics of the modern 
university); WILLIAM DERESIEWICZ, EXCELLENT SHEEP: THE MISEDUCATION OF THE 
AMERICAN ELITE AND THE WAY TO A MEANINGFUL LIFE (2014) (commenting on the dearth 
of critical thinking among the educated class); THE UNIVERSITY NEXT DOOR: WHAT IS A 
COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITY, WHO DOES IT EDUCATE, AND CAN IT SURVIVE? (Mark 	
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university have typically focused on its First Amendment dimensions rather than on 
the challenges to its institutional coherence.8 For example, Robert Post has examined 
the pedagogical implications of the university’s unique blend of academic inquiry 
and free speech.9 Mary-Rose Papandrea has argued for strengthening student speech 
protections in light of the university’s role as “the quintessential marketplace of 
ideas.”10 And Paul Horwitz has suggested that the university is the paradigmatic 
example of a “First Amendment institution” that warrants special constitutional 
consideration.11  
This Article links insights from these two groups of scholars to explore the 
purpose of the university and defend it against growing technological, ideological, 
and cultural pressures. The connection between the First Amendment and 
institutional purpose is unsurprising. Expressive restrictions always set the 
boundaries of expression for political communities, and the university is a kind of 
political community. These boundaries reflect something about a community’s 
goals, values, and—ultimately—its purpose. 
Part I briefly sets forth a normative framework for a university that is dialogical, 
democratic, and residential. Part II builds upon this understanding of the university 
by considering its intersection with five contemporary First Amendment issues: 




Schneider & KC Deane eds. 2015) (opining on whether comprehensive universities can 
respond to the nation’s call to action); CHAD WELLMON, ORGANIZING ENLIGHTENMENT: 
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 
(2015) (detailing key role of research universities in developing modern information culture). 
8 The word “university” imperfectly captures the class of institutions that most 
contemporary scholars assume in writing about institutions of higher education. It also 
includes colleges whose lack of certain professional schools formally distinguishes them 
from universities but which otherwise share the characteristics of the institutions of higher 
education that usually occupy the core of First Amendment analysis. 
9 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 67–69 (2012). In another book 
coauthored with Matthew Finkin, Post takes a different approach and focuses only on 
“professional understandings of academic freedom” to the exclusion of “[t]he constitutional 
law of academic freedom.” MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON 
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 8 (2009). Post and Finkin suggest 
that the “consensus vision of the purposes of American higher education” has concluded that 
“[u]niversities and colleges are autonomous professional institutions dedicated to creating 
new knowledge and to educating young adults to think for themselves.” Id. at 7; see also 
STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 3–18 (2008) (discussing the role of 
the university and its members). 
10 Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 1801, 1802 (2017). 
11 PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 140 (2013). 
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I.  WHAT IS A UNIVERSITY? 
 
Kerr’s characterization of the university as a “multiversity” remains accurate; 
most institutions of higher education are unable to articulate a singular, unified 
purpose.12 In the face of such confusion, this Article argues that a central purpose, if 
not the central purpose, of the university is to be a place of facilitating disagreement 
across differences, what the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has termed a “place of 
constrained disagreement, of imposed participation in conflict.”13 The paradigmatic 
university pursuing this purpose embodies least three core characteristics: it is 
dialogical; it is democratic; and it is residential. 
 
A.  The Dialogical University 
 
The first characteristic of a university oriented toward constrained 
disagreement is that it is dialogical. Under MacIntyre’s vision, “a central 
responsibility of higher education would be to initiate students into conflict.”14 The 
process requires participants “to enter into controversy with other rival standpoints, 
doing so both in order to exhibit what is mistaken in that rival standpoint . . . and in 
order to test and retest the central theses advanced from one’s own point of view 
against the strongest possible objections to them.”15 John Courtney Murray’s 
succinct formulation adds another dimension: the university should be a place where 
creeds are intelligibly at war with one another.16  
MacIntyre and Murray hint at two necessary conditions for genuine argument 
within the university: disagreement must be constrained,17 and creedal war must 
proceed intelligibly.18 Constraint and intelligibility create the possibility of genuine 
dialogue across difference. Disagreement without any constraints would open the 
door to manipulation and even violence. Similarly, creedal war with no intelligibility 
would render communication impossible. On the other hand, we never attain perfect 
constraint and complete intelligibility—to do so would mean overcoming the 
nuances of human emotion and the limits of interpersonal communication. In the 																																																								
12 I mean to highlight challenges to the coherence of purpose within specific institutions, 
as distinct from the properly diverse purposes represented by different kinds of institutions. 
See John Garvey, Introduction, AALS Symposium on Institutional Pluralism: The Role of 
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125, 127 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of “institutional pluralism”). 
13 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 230–31 (1990) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, 
MORAL ENQUIRY].  
14 Id. at 231.  
15 Id. at 231.  
16 JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 125 (1960).  
17 MACINTYRE, MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 13, at 230–32.  
18 MURRAY, supra note 16, at 125–130. 	
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university, most of our disagreements are modestly constrained and our creedal wars 
somewhat intelligible.  
These conditions suggest a shared commitment to a mode of discourse that 
could encourage some of the university’s deepest values. That is no small 
achievement. As Chad Wellmon observes, “these values are not simply bureaucratic 
or professional procedures.”19 Rather, “[t]hey are robust epistemic virtues—an 
openness to debate, a commitment to critical inquiry, attention to detail, a respect 
for argument—embedded in historical practices particular to the university.”20  
The significance of modestly constrained disagreement can be shown by 
contrasting two controversial figures: Ann Coulter and Charles Murray.21 In 2017, 
Coulter and Murray both made national headlines when colleges and universities 
revoked speaking invitations extended to them by student groups.22 For this thought 
experiment about constrained disagreement, think of Murray and Coulter as points 
along a spectrum, with Murray closer to modest constraint and Coulter closer to the 
lack of any constraints. Many progressives dislike both Murray and Coulter.23 But 
on our spectrum of constrained disagreement, there is a lot of distance between these 
two figures. Murray is a scholar who is willing to respond to questions and engage 
in debate. Coulter is a bomb thrower who delights in insulting those with whom she 
disagrees. In other words, even if Coulter’s argument satisfies John Courtney 
Murray’s intelligibility condition, it lacks MacIntyre’s condition of constrained 
disagreement. We might say that Charles Murray plays by the university’s rules of 
the game and Coulter does not. 
We can make similar distinctions at the other end of the political spectrum. The 
Black Lives Matter activist who delivers a university lecture about methods of 
protests and the reasons underlying those protests is adhering to the university’s 
discourse-enabling constraints on disagreement. The same activist who disrupts the 
speech of a university administrator shows little commitment to these constraints. 
The differences between Ann Coulter and Charles Murray, and the differences 
between the activist as interlocutor and the activist as disruptor, demonstrate the 
modest constraints that shape a university’s discourse. The law enforces the outer 
boundaries of these constraints. Student activists cannot incite imminent 
lawbreaking.24 English professors cannot teach calculus in their poetry classes. And 																																																								
19 Wellmon, Moral Clarity, supra note 1.  
20 Id.  
21 Coulter is a conservative political commentator, and Murray is a conservative 
scholar. Both have made highly controversial claims in their speaking and writing. 
22 See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, In Ann Coulter’s Speech Battle, Signs that Conservatives 
Are Emboldened, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/us/ 
politics/ann-coulter-university-of-california-berkeley.html [https://perma.cc/7KFJ-HZM7]; 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by “Bell Curve” Author at Vermont College, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/middlebury-college-
charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html [https://perma.cc/U7G5-46LS]. 
23 Peters, supra note 22. 
24 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 	
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university administrators cannot limit access to a public dialogue based on race, 
gender, or sexuality. But most other discourse constraints are not legally 
enforceable—they arise out of customary norms and civic practices that we ask of 
one another.25 
Constraint and intelligibility are only half of MacIntyre’s and Murray’s 
formulations. Genuine argument also means real disagreement and the possibility of 
creedal war. Many of these disagreements and conflicts will involve imbalances of 
power; two sides of a creedal war seldom reach cultural and political equilibrium. 
When two sides respectively represent “minority” and “majority” positions, it is 
important to allow minority perspectives to be voiced. Often, a willingness to listen 
to these perspectives is embedded in the customary norms of the university. But on 
some of the most contested political, religious, and ideological issues, it is easy to 
think of examples where certain perspectives are explicitly or implicitly excluded. 
The dialogical university works to protect against these exclusions under conditions 
of constrained agreement and intelligibly warring creeds. 
 
B.  The Democratic University 
 
The second university characteristic oriented toward facilitating disagreement 
across difference is the democratic nature of higher education. As Andrew Delbanco 
has suggested, “the college classroom has been a rehearsal space for democracy—a 
place where students learn to speak and listen with civility to peers whose 
perspective on the world differs from their own.”26 The democratic university must 
also strive to protect minority, dissenting, or unpopular views—an aspiration that 
draws its inspiration from the First Amendment. The history of our country suggests 
that civic practices and cultural norms can quickly turn hostile against unpopular 
and dissenting viewpoints. The First Amendment at its best shields and protects 
these viewpoints from majoritarian suppression, sometimes at great cost. As the 
Supreme Court has emphasized, “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do 
not matter much” and the test of freedom is “the right to differ as to things that touch 
the heart of the existing order.”27  
The First Amendment expressly governs public universities and informs the 
culture and norms of many private universities.28 The distinction between public and 																																																								
25 See generally JOHN INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING 
THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016) (providing an extended discussion of these aspirational 
civic practices). 
26 ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD BE xiii-xiv (2012).  
27 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
28 See, e.g., UNIV. OF PA., HANDBOOK FOR FACULTY AND ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATORS 
(2017), http://provost.upenn.edu/uploads/media_items/ii-a-academic-freedom-and-
responsibility.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q4A-92NQ] (granting faculty members at the 
private University of Pennsylvania “freedom of inquiry,” “freedom in research” and 
“freedom in the classroom”); Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and 	
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private universities is both longstanding and important.29 In fact, some private 
universities with religious or other missions properly constrain aspects of discourse 
based on their institutional purpose.30  But even within these constraints, the 
normative aspirations of the First Amendment can still function to protect minority, 
dissenting, and unpopular views.  
Public institutions can also adopt these cultural norms; in other words, they can 
view themselves not only as constitutionally constrained by the First Amendment 
but also as occupying a particular social role that embodies First Amendment values. 
Consider, for example, this passage from the plurality opinion in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire: 
 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital 
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. 
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges 
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.31 
 
Sweezy identifies an instrumental role that the public university plays in preparing 
future generations of citizens.32 But the university also enacts the aspirations of 
democratic governance when it models the free exchange of ideas, facilitates 
relationships across deep difference, and points the next generation of leaders toward 
the possibility of a shared political project.33  																																																								
Duties of Law Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REV. 253, 264–65 (2003) (noting that 
university customs may protect faculty members’ academic freedom at private universities). 
29 See, e.g., Safia Samee Ali, Harvard Revokes Admission of Several Students for 
Posting ‘Offensive’ Memes, NBCNEWS.COM (June 5, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/harvard-revokes-admission-several-students-posting-offensive-memes-
n768361 [https://perma.cc/H4UK-GTE2] (quoting law professor Katherine Franke as 
saying, “The First Amendment’s Free Speech protections apply only to violations by public 
entities, and since Harvard is a private university the First Amendment does not apply.”). 
Additionally, public schools ostensibly serve public purposes, while private schools might 
advance non-public missions, as in the case of some religious colleges and universities.  
30 See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Fall From Grace, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 15, 2011), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/08/15/fall-grace [https://perma.cc/HPD2-
BJ3A] (detailing science faculty member’s resignation from Calvin College over publication 
in tension with official school doctrine); Lauren Jones, Note, Straddling the Wall: Academic 
Freedom in Religious Universities and How Institutions May Engage in Judicious Self-
Regulation, 30 REV. LITIG. 319, 320 (2011) (noting Catholic University of America’s 1989 
policy prohibiting faculty members from advocating pro-choice politics). 
31 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
32 Cf. DELBANCO, supra note 26, at 29 (“It should be obvious that the best chance we 
have to maintain a functioning democracy is a citizenry that can tell the difference between 
demagoguery and responsible arguments”). 
33 Nor are these merely antiquated notions from an earlier era. Justice O’Connor drew 
upon similar connections in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that 	
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These democratic aspirations will not be realized to the same extent at every 
institution of higher education. Some private institutions will prioritize other 
aspirations to varying degrees. But differences will also unfold among public 
institutions. Not every public school will accommodate constrained disagreement 
and intelligibly warring creeds. In other words, not every public school will share 
the same purpose or institutional culture. A community college is not the same as a 
public research university. A satellite campus of the University of Wyoming is not 
the same as the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. The United States Military 
Academy is not the same as the University of California at Berkeley. Each of these 
institutions has a public-facing mission, but not all represent what Paul Horwitz has 
characterized as the “paradigmatic example of a First Amendment institution.”34  
Despite these institutional differences, the Supreme Court has assumed 
something like Horwitz’s ideal when addressing the First Amendment in the higher 
education context.35 For example, in its 1972 decision Healy v. James, the Court 
asserted that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas.’”36 The year after Healy, the Court underscored that “the mere 
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state 
university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of 
decency.’”37 																																																								
“universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition” in light of “the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment”). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has suggested that the “public” nature of public universities might be different in 
kind than other public governmental functions. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 203 
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (suggesting a “constitutional distinction between the 
infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder 
administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
908 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that the First Amendment “may speak with 
a different voice” when the government acts in its non-sovereign capacity).  
34 HORWITZ, supra note 11. Horwitz highlights some unique aspects of the university: 
academic freedom, tenure, curricular development, selective admissions, and student speech. 
Id. at 109–10, 122–28. But the most important function of the university, in his view, is a 
“uniquely academic contribution to public discourse.” Id. at 120–21. Even the modern 
research university falls short of this ideal. Consider, for example, Horwitz’s home 
institution, the University of Alabama. Some of its scholars contribute to the pursuit of 
knowledge, but major sections of the university focus on alumni partnerships, affiliated 
hospitals and clinics, and high-profile athletics, all of which have little to do with “public 
discourse.”  
35 Importantly, that doctrine has largely assumed the same basic understanding of the 
university adopted in this Article: the four-year residential institution of higher education.  
36 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972). 
37 Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973). The university’s interest in the 
free exchange ideas does not compel other governmental actors to guarantee the fullness of 
that exchange against all competing interests. In a case decided three days after Healy, the 
Supreme Court overruled a lower court’s holding that the First Amendment interests of 
American scholars who had invited a Belgian Marxist to participate in academic conferences 	
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The Court’s reliance on the First Amendment to protect universities from 
majoritarian orthodoxies predates Healy. It prevailed even in the face of the Second 
Red Scare when many other sectors of society capitulated to fear-mongering and 
charges of guilt by association.  In 1957, Sweezy rebuffed efforts by state officials 
to inquire into the political affiliations of faculty.38 Insisting that “teachers and 
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new 
maturity and understanding,”39 the plurality made clear that compelling a professor 
to disclose the nature of his past expressions and associations ran afoul of the First 
Amendment.40 In three subsequent decisions, the Court struck down laws restricting 
universities from employing members of the Communist Party.41 
These hard-fought battles established basic principles that transcend ideology. 
In the 1950s, public universities sought to exclude socialist and communist ideas.42 
Today, some of these same schools sometimes target politically conservative 																																																								
required the government to grant him a visa to enter the country. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). The Court held that the Attorney General’s justifications for 
granting or denying visas under the authority delegated to him under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 need not be balanced against “the First Amendment interests of those 
who seek personal communication with the [visa] applicant.” Id. Even so, the majority 
acknowledged that the public’s right to receive information “is nowhere more vital than in 
our schools and universities.” Id. at 763 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Marshall’s 
dissent also called attention to the academic nature of the proposed interactions. Id. at 774 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Dr. Ernest Mandel, a citizen of Belgium, is an internationally 
famous Marxist scholar and journalist. He was invited to our country by a group of American 
scholars who wished to meet him for discussion and debate. With firm plans for conferences, 
colloquia and lectures, the American hosts were stunned to learn that Mandel had been 
refused permission to enter our country.”). 
38 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 254–55. 
39 Id. at 250.  
40 Id. at 254–55. 
41 See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 368 (1964) (finding unconstitutionally vague 
state statutes requiring University of Washington faculty and staff to take loyalty oaths as a 
condition of employment); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 60 (1967) (finding state loyalty 
oath applicable to teachers at the University of Maryland hostile to academic freedom); 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (finding unconstitutional state statutes 
that prevented the public employment of university teachers unless they certified that they 
were not members of the Communist Party or subversive groups).  
42 Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 564 n.6 (1956) (quoting ASS’N OF 
AM UNIVS., THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR FACULTIES 
(Mar. 24, 1953)) (“Above all, [the university professor] owes his colleagues in the university 
complete candor and perfect integrity, precluding any kind of clandestine or conspiratorial 
activities. He owes equal candor to the public. If he is called upon to answer for his 
convictions it is his duty as a citizen to speak out. It is even more definitely his duty as a 
professor. . . . In this respect, invocation of the Fifth Amendment places upon a professor a 
heavy burden of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university 
an obligation to reexamine his qualifications for membership in its society.”). 	
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speakers.43 The exclusion of ideas or ideologies, simply because one finds them 
unpleasant or dangerous, is usually inconsistent with the role of the democratic 
university as a place of genuine inquiry and debate.44  
 
C.  The Residential University 
 
The final characteristic of the kind of university best situated to pursue the 
MacIntyrean aim of constrained disagreement is one whose programs, place, and 
people allow for deep and sustained dialogue across difference. Although a variety 
of institutions might fill this role, the paradigmatic example is the residential 
university. 
Dialogue within the residential university is complicated by the intersection of 
multiple actors, roles, and places. In one sense, the same could be said of many other 
settings. For example, police officers may speak in their official capacities or as 
private citizens; they may express themselves on the job or in a private setting; and 
they may confront challenges in their use of social media that complicates keeping 
their roles distinct.45 But the university is a more complex version of this general 
puzzle.46 It encompasses administrators, faculty, students, staff, and visitors. Some 
of these actors perform multiple roles. As a faculty member, I am an employee, 
teacher, researcher, and community member at my institution. Some of my roles 
unfold in multiple places. And I am not alone. Students find themselves in 
classrooms, dorm rooms, common spaces, off-campus settings, and online forums. 
The different actors, roles, and places of the university commonly intersect with one 
another, with each combination implicating different norms and values. These varied 
contexts also mean that free speech is not an unqualified value or absolute norm 
across the entire university.47  																																																								
43 See supra note 22. 
44 But see Ulrich Baer, What “Snowflakes” Get Right About Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/opinion/what-liberal-snowflakes-
get-right-about-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/2QPE-8X58] (“The great value and 
importance of freedom of expression, for higher education and for democracy, is hard to 
overestimate. But it has been regrettably easy for commentators to create a simple dichotomy 
between a younger generation’s oversensitivity and free speech as an absolute good that leads 
to the truth.”). 
45 See, e.g., San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (First Amendment does not 
protect police officer from adverse employment action for selling videotapes of sexually 
explicit acts he undertook off-duty in a police uniform); Heffernan v. Paterson, 578 U.S. 
1412, 1416 (2016) (First Amendment protects off-duty police officer from adverse 
employment action for perceived political activity). 
46 For thoughtful considerations of the unique characteristics of the university within a 
broader First Amendment landscape, see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: 
PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 259–93 (2009); PAUL 
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2012). 
47 The observation applies to the First Amendment more generally. For example, while 
the text of the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make “no law” abridging 	
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The residential university is a complex physical place, a separate “town” of 
sorts, playing host to a variety of campus spaces with numerous purposes. 48 For 
students, the university encompasses every aspect of life: eating, sleeping, 
exercising, and socializing. Many students live on campus, and even those who live 
off campus often cluster together in groups. These realities have not gone unnoticed, 
and smart people have spent a lot of time thinking about the benefits of this 
proximity.49 There is something to be said for carefully constructed shared spaces 
like dorm commons, dining halls, campus coffee shops, gyms with smoothie bars, 
and other places to congregate.50 These spaces also provide a degree of safety and 
stability important to providing the background conditions for dialoguing across 
difference.51 And even in this era of social media, online education, and virtual 																																																								
speech, Congress makes all kinds of speech-restricting laws. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, 
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional 
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004); DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, 
NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 263 
(2008) (making a similar observation). 
48 See, e.g., Hays Cty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Roughly 
5,000 students live and work on the campus, making the campus, in the words of the 
University’s own promotional booklet, a ‘town’ of which the resident student will be a 
‘contributing citizen’ and ‘voting member.’”); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976–77 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (“A modern university contains a variety of fora. Its facilities may include private 
offices, classrooms, laboratories, academic medical centers, concert halls, large sports 
stadiums and arenas, and open spaces . . . . Some places on the University’s campus, such as 
the administration building, the president’s office, or classrooms are not opened as fora for 
use by the student body or anyone else . . . . Other campus locations, such as auditoriums or 
stadiums allow for certain speech on certain topics. These locations may be described as 
designated public fora. Further, the public streets and sidewalks which surround the campus 
but are not on the campus likely constitute traditional public fora . . . .”). 
49 See, e.g., Lauren T. Schudde, The Causal Effect of Campus Residency on College 
Student Retention, 34 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 581, 581 (2011); Ruth N. Lopez Turley & 
Geoffrey Wodtke, College Residence and Academic Performance: Who Benefits from Living 
on Campus?, 45 URBAN EDUC. 506 (2010); Gary R. Pike, The Differential Effects of On- and 
Off-Campus Living Arrangements on Students’ Openness to Diversity, 39 NASPA J. OF 
STUDENT AFFS. RES. & PRAC. 283 (2002). 
50 As one college student quipped, “In a university with a student body diverse enough 
that students may feel that they have little in common, a literal common ground is needed.” 
Sarah C. Stein Lubrano, The Productivity of Social Space: Harvard should replace its student 
center, HARV. CRIMSON, (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.thecrimson.com/column/exodoxa/ 
article/2012/4/18/social-space-productivity/ [https://perma.cc/XM2C-484Q]. 
51 The prevalence of sexual assault, and the far less frequent but still psychologically 
unsettling risk of campus shootings both qualify this claim of safety in important ways. These 
questions become more complicated at schools with large percentages of students who live 
off-campus or where questions surrounding safety and material provisions are exacerbated 
by wealth disparities among students. See, e.g., Janese Silvey, Tiger Pantry aims to feed MU 
community, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.columbiatribune.com 	
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relationships, there remains value in face-to-face interactions facilitated through 
shared physical space. This is not to say that virtual interactions can never 
accomplish the pedagogical or relational goals of the university.52 But shared space 
and personal dialogue that incorporates physical presence can enhance these goals 
in meaningful ways.53  
Another important aspect of the residential university is the typical age of its 
students. The Supreme Court generally looks to the age of students in distinguishing 
between student speech in universities and in secondary schools. Even though Healy 
came just three years after the Court’s seminal decision in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,54 the Court chose not to apply the standard 
set forth in Tinker.55 In subsequent student speech cases, the Court has suggested 
that at least part of the justification for weaker First Amendment protections in 
secondary schools rests on the developmental stage of the students. For example, in 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a case involving secondary students, the 																																																								
/f917a28f-0151-5632-8b82-e2c30ac236b1.html [https://perma.cc/49VK-MEVZ] 
(describing a food pantry for staff and students at the University of Missouri and quoting the 
pantry’s director explaining that “[a]lthough hunger is not a visible problem on campus, 
based on the number of students receiving financial aid, food insecurity is an issue”). 
52 See generally John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2013) 
(discussing some of the relational possibilities of virtual interactions). 
53 Justice Marshall remarked on this difference in a footnote in his dissent in Kleindienst 
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). Disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning that a Belgian 
Marxist denied an American visa could nonetheless send taped lectures, Marshall observed: 
 
The availability to appellees of Mandel’s books and taped lectures is no substitute 
for live, face-to-face discussion and debate, just as the availability to us of briefs 
and exhibits does not supplant the essential place of oral argument in this Court’s 
work. Lengthy citations for this proposition, which the majority apparently 
concedes, are unnecessary. I simply note that in a letter to Henrik Lorenz, 
accepting an invitation to lecture at the University of Leiden and to discuss “the 
radiation problem,” Albert Einstein observed that, “[i]n these unfinished things, 
people understand one another with difficulty unless talking face to face.”  
 
Id. at 776 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Developments in the Law—The National 
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1154 n.101 (1972)). Our modes 
of communication have advanced since Marshall wrote in 1972 (or Einstein before him), but 
personal interaction remains unmatched by its technologically mediated surrogates. 
54 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).  
55 In university cases, the Court usually only cites Tinker in support of the principle that 
the First Amendment applies to the public university. See generally Christian Legal Soc’y v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217 (2000); Minn. St. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 
(1973). Mary-Rose Papandrea has observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has cited Tinker in 
some of its university speech cases, but it has never relied on the Tinker standard to restrict 
speech” in those cases. Papandrea, supra note 10, at 1841. 	
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Court noted “the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities 
acting in loco parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from 
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”56  
The Court has hinted that these concerns may not apply in the university 
context. In Widmar v. Vincent, the majority mentioned in a footnote that college 
students were “less impressionable than younger students.”57 And in Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, Justice Souter’s 
concurrence observed that the Court’s “cases dealing with the right of teaching 
institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high 
schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least 
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education.”58 
There may have been a time, as Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in 
Morse v. Frederick,59 when a college professor’s relationship with his students was 
more akin to that of a high school teacher.60 But as the Third Circuit has noted, in 
the modern era, the “public university has evolved into a vastly different creature.”61 
The “authoritarian role of today’s college administrations has been notably 
																																																								
56 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (“This Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest 
of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and 
the audience may include children. . . . These cases recognize the obvious concern on the 
part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—especially 
in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech” (citing 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) and Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) 
(plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions))).  
57 454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (1981) (noting that college students, as “young adults . . . . are 
less impressionable than younger students”); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 
685 (1971) (“There are generally significant differences between the religious aspects of 
church-related institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary 
schools.”); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015) (“key rationales for 
restricting students’ speech are to ensure that students ‘are not exposed to material that may 
be inappropriate for their level of maturity . . . .’[but] [c]oncerns about student maturity 
cannot justify restrictions on speech in [the graduate school] context because certification 
candidates are adults” (internal citations omitted)).  
58 529 U.S. 238, n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  
59 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (permitting a school to regulate speech reasonably seen as 
promoting drug use because of the “‘special characteristics of the school environment,’ and 
the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse,” where the speech was a student 
poster reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”).  
60 Id. at 412 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that in an earlier era, “[e]ven at the 
college level, strict obedience was required of students,” as teaching models “fostered 
absolute institutional control of students by faculty both inside and outside the classroom.” 
(citing Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey 
and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (1991))).  
61 McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2010).  	
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diluted.”62 Meanwhile, students have assumed some rights and responsibilities 
formerly held by administrators.63 In fact, “[e]ighteen-year-old students are now 
identified with an expansive bundle of individual and social interests and possess 
discrete rights not held by college students from decades past . . . . [T]oday students 
vigorously claim the right to define and regulate their own lives.”64  
Lower courts have examined more directly whether “the free speech standards 
that developed in K–12 school cases apply in the university setting.”65 Their 
conclusions have been less than clear.66 The Seventh Circuit illustrates the 																																																								
62 Id. (citing Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979)). The Third 
Circuit even notes that the “idea that public universities exercise strict control over students 
via an in loco parentis relationship has decayed to the point of irrelevance.” McCauley, 618 
F.2d at 245; see also Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that colleges 
do not act in loco parentis per New York law). 
63 McCauley, 618 F.2d at 244 (quoting Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138–40). 
64 Id. at 245 (quoting Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140).  
65 See, e.g., Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 519 n.5 (Minn. 2012); see also 
Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over 
College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 27, 46–49 (2008) 
(observing that courts have struggled with adapting First Amendment doctrine from 
elementary and high schools to the university).  
66 See, e.g., McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247; DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318 
(3d Cir. 2008) (writing that courts “must proceed with greater caution [than in high school 
cases] before imposing speech restrictions on adult students at a college campus”); Hosty v. 
Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated on reh’g en banc, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13195 (7th Cir. 2003), different result reached on reh’g, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11761 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“Hazelwood’s rationale for limiting the First Amendment rights of high school 
journalism students is not a good fit for students at colleges or universities. The differences 
between a college and a high school are far greater than the obvious differences in curriculum 
and extracurricular activities. The missions of each are distinct reflecting the unique needs 
of students of differing ages and maturity levels”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 955 (9th Cir. 
2002) (upholding a state university thesis committee’s refusal to approve a graduate student’s 
thesis based on a nonconforming section under the Hazelwood standard); Kincaid v. Gibson, 
236 F.3d 342, 346 nn. 4–5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“Because we find that a forum analysis 
requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited public forum—rather than a nonpublic 
forum—we agree with the parties that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”); 
Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 679 (8th Cir. 1997) (using a substantial interference test 
and citing Tinker); Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 
n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspapers.”); Gay Student 
Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1330 (5th Cir. 1984) (using Tinker to invalidate 
one justification for a college’s refusal to recognize a gay student group); Gay Students Org. 
of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974) (same); Williams v. Eaton, 
443 F.2d 422, 430 (10th Cir. 1971) (reversing a lower court’s dismissal of football players’ 
First Amendment claim when their coach dismissed them after they wore black armbands in 
protest of the opposing school’s alleged racially discriminatory practices and saying “[t]he 
starting point for weighing the constitutional claim of the plaintiffs is Tinker”); Norton v. 
Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195, 210–11 (6th Cir. 1969) (“If, in 	
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confusion. In 2003, it examined the First Amendment rights of student journalists at 
a public university.67 The Supreme Court had previously applied a First Amendment 
analysis to high school student journalists in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.68 But Judge Evans steered clear of Hazelwood’s framework, noting that 
“[t]he differences between a college and a high school are far greater than the 
obvious differences in curriculum and extracurricular activities” in part because 
“[t]he missions of each are distinct reflecting the unique needs of students of 
differing ages and maturity levels.”69 After a rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed course, embracing Hazelwood.70 Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook 
concluded that in some areas, like ensuring the quality of work produced under the 
school’s auspices and “dissociating the school from ‘any position other than 
neutrality on matters of political controversy,’ there is no sharp difference between 
high school and college papers.”71 This blurring of standards across institutional 
lines misses the fact that universities and secondary schools have different purposes 
and missions—and quite plausibly different First Amendment norms and 
limitations.72 																																																								
Tinker, the United States Supreme Court found the evidentiary record inadequate to support 
a finding of material and substantial interference with the normal operations of a junior and 
senior high school; then there is certainly insufficient evidence in the present record to 
support a finding of ‘material and substantial interference’ in the more adult educational 
environment of a university campus.”). 
67 Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). 
68 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988). 
69 Hosty, 325 F.3d at 948.  
70 Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735–76 (7th Cir. 2005) (vacating the court’s earlier 
refusal to use Hazelwood, and applying Hazelwood instead). 
71 Id. at 735 (internal citations omitted). The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also 
applied Hazelwood to the university setting. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 
1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that, under Hazelwood, a school may compel a student to say 
profane words in a theatrical script if the reading is reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns, per Hazelwood); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 
1991) (relying on Hazelwood to find that a university classroom, like a school newspaper, is 
not a public forum and therefore a university can restrict a professor’s ability to discuss his 
personal beliefs in class).  
72 Consider Judge Easterbrook’s reliance on Hazelwood’s rationale that a secondary 
school should be able to disassociate from “any position other than neutrality on matters of 
political controversy.” Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)). Easterbrook’s opinion fails to recognize that the Supreme Court 
immediately qualifies that Hazelwood passage by observing that secondary schools “would 
be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him 
to adjust normally to his environment.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493 (1954)). See also Papandrea, supra note 10, at 1828. (“Relying on decisions in the K–
12 and workplace contexts is deeply troubling in light of the fundamental differences 
between universities, workplaces, and K–12 schools.”).  	
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II.  CONTEMPORARY FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
 
The preceding observations have set forth an aspirational framework for the 
dialogical, democratic, and residential university. This section explores five issues 
that emerge within that framework: academic freedom, public employee speech, 
public forums, safe spaces, and religious pluralism. Its formal constitutional analysis 
focuses on public universities subject to the constraints of the First Amendment, but 
many of its observations have normative implications for private universities. These 
are certainly not the only issues facing university campuses today. In fact, they are 
not even the only First Amendment issues: university lawyers regularly confront a 
host of First Amendment issues including fair use of copyrighted material,73 patent 
rights related to scholarly research,74 and expressive restrictions in Title IX 
investigations.75  But the five issues addressed in this Part may be the ones most 
closely aligned with the question of purpose suggested by MacIntyre and Murray, 
an increasingly urgent question amid growing pressures on the university. 
 
A.  Academic Freedom 
 
Modern American understandings of academic freedom first appeared in a 
1915 statement by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).76 
Twenty-five years later, the AAUP revisited these ideas in its 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.77 These statements suggest that one 																																																								
73 See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(upholding under fair use a digitized literary database, created by a consortium of research 
universities for restricted uses, against a copyright challenge). 
74 See, e.g., St. John’s Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment and discussing a professor’s contractual 
obligation to assign patentable inventions to his university).  
75 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Northwestern’s Kipnis Cleared in Title IX Investigation, 
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/01/northwesterns-kipnis-cleared-in-title-ix-investigation/? 
utm_term=.97ccd0dfb1bd [https://perma.cc/WEG6-39VE] (detailing Title IX investigation 
of Northwestern University Professor Laura Kipnis, triggered by an essay she wrote for The 
Chronicle of Higher Education). 
76 See 1 Bull. Am. Ass’n of U. Professors, Declaration of Principles 15 (1915), 
reprinted in General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 
91 Ind. L.J. 57 (2015). 
77 See Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940), available at 
https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWC7-7XLH] 
[hereinafter Statement of Principles] (In developing the preceding statement, the AAUP 
collaborated with other organizations including the Association of American Colleges 
(AAC), which has since been renamed the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities.); See Jerry G. Gaff, ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR A NEW AGE, ASSOC. OF AM. 
COLLEGE AND U. 1 (June 12, 2015), https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/Gaff_Academic 	
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of the core principles of academic freedom is that “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom 
in the classroom in discussing their subject . . . .”78 But the realities of academic 
freedom are not as clear as these ideals. 
Robert Post and Matthew Finkin have observed that “[t]he American concept 
of academic freedom grew directly out of the German concept of akademische 
Freiheit.”79 But those who attempted to transplant the German idea “confronted an 
organization of higher education very different from that which existed in 
Germany.”80 The primary difference was that German universities were faculty-run 
while American universities “were instead governed by a lay board chosen by a 
private proprietor, by a sponsoring religious denomination, or by a political 
process.”81 This difference meant that “in America nonscholars retained the right to 
decide what should and should not be taught, what should and should not be 
published.”82 
The mismatch between academic freedom and nonacademic governance left 
unclear how to resolve conflicts between a university’s institutional decision-makers 
and its individual faculty members. The AAUP clearly favored the latter, a position 
reinforced in some judicial rhetoric. In a 1967 decision declaring unconstitutional a 
state law aimed at restricting Communist teachers, Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion asserted that “[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned.”83 For Brennan, academic freedom was “a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.”84  
But courts have not always agreed with Justice Brennan.85 One of the most 
striking qualifications to faculty academic freedom came in a 1998 case, Edwards v. 
California University of Pennsylvania.86 There, a tenured professor challenged the 																																																								
Freedom.pdf. 
78 Statement of Principles, supra note 77, at 14.  
79 FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 23.  
80 Id. at 24.  
81 Id. at 24.  
82 Id. at 25.  
83 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).  
84 Id.  
85 Walter Metzger has described the professional and judicial definitions of academic 
freedom as “seriously incompatible and probably ultimately irreconcilable.” Walter P. 
Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 
66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1988). Metzger also observes that “no American court had ruled 
that any provision of the federal constitution protected academic freedom” until the middle 
of the twentieth century. Id. at 1285. The Supreme Court’s earliest consideration of these 
issues (in the context of public schoolteachers rather than university faculty) relied on the 
First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly, not academic freedom. See, e.g., Adler 
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). 
86 156 F.3d 488 (3d. Cir. 1998). 	
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university’s decision to restrict his choice of classroom materials and suspend him 
with pay for part of an academic term after he purportedly used a course to advance 
his religious views.87 In an opinion authored by then-Judge Samuel Alito, the Third 
Circuit concluded that “a public university professor does not have a First 
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom.”88 The Eleventh 
Circuit held similarly in Bishop v. Aronov89 that it could “not find support to 
conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.”90  
Even judicial rhetoric more friendly to academic freedom has sometimes 
focused on the institution of the university rather than the individual faculty member. 
For example, Justice Frankfurter’s oft-quoted Sweezy91 concurrence emphasized 
“‘four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may 
be admitted to study.”92 Other cases have further suggested that conflicts between 
professor and university will be resolved in favor of the university.93 The Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed this issue. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,94 it concluded 
that the First Amendment provided limited protection to a public employee’s private 
speech but left open the question of whether its approach to public employee speech 
“would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship 
or teaching.”95 Since Garcetti, three circuit courts have ruled against tenured 
professors who asserted violations of First Amendment academic freedom rights, 																																																								
87 Id. at 489–90. 
88 Id. at 491.  
89 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).  
90 Id. at 1075.  
91 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
92 Id. at 262 (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (Elbert van de 
Sandt Centlivres et al., eds., Johannasburg: Whitwatersrand Univ. Press (1957)) (emphasis 
added).  
93 See, e.g., Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986) (“To accept 
plaintiff’s contention that an untenured teacher’s grading policy is constitutionally protected 
and insulates him from discharge when his standards conflict with those of the university 
would be to constrict the university in defining and performing its educational mission. The 
first amendment does not require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto 
himself.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (defining 
academic freedom as “[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education . . . .”); Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3rd Cir. 2001) (holding that a public 
university professor’s First Amendment right to expression does not apply to the school’s 
grade assignment procedures); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that—compared to other public employees—public university professors do not 
have any additional, academic freedom-based rights); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 
665 F.2d 547, 553 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting plaintiff professor’s claim that his refusal 
to assign a certain grade constituted a constitutionally protected teaching method).  
94 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
95 Id. at 425.  	
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either denying such a right on the merits or finding it was not clearly established for 
purposes of qualified immunity.96 
The judicial presumption that academic freedom belongs to the university 
rather than to individual faculty members is at odds with the norms espoused by the 
AAUP. Moreover, some of the reasoning underlying that intuition seems deeply 
misguided. For example, the Eleventh Circuit’s Aronov opinion expressed a “trust 
that the University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors in 
pursuit of academic freedom.”97 In the court’s view, “University officials are 
undoubtedly aware that quality faculty members will be hard to attract and retain if 
they are to be shackled in much of what they do.”98 This kind of market solution 
ignores the likelihood that some of the most unpopular and destabilizing views will 
be rejected across most institutions; think, for example, of faculty advocating for 
civil rights on university campuses in the Jim Crow South.  
On the other hand, individual faculty do not have an unfettered ability to teach 
whatever they want in the classroom. Nobody thinks a physics professor has a First 
Amendment right to teach French poetry instead of electricity and magnetism in her 
introductory physics course. Perhaps the classroom comes closer to a limited public 
forum in which expressive freedoms are contextually limited. Just as aspiring 																																																								
96 Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 770 (7th Cir. 2008); Hong v. Grant, 403 F. App’x. 
236, 237 (9th Cir. 2010); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2009). All of these 
cases involved administrative functions rather than the scholarship or teaching mentioned in 
Garcetti. The assumption that academic freedom is an institutional—rather than an 
individual—right also draws some support from the Supreme Court’s analysis of affirmative 
action in higher education. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (contending that a university can “make its own judgments 
as to education”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (adopting Powell’s 
reasoning). See also Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
545 F.3d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (J. Edwards, concurring) (concluding that Grutter adopted 
and extended institutional academic freedom by granting constitutional protection to 
admissions decisions); Judith Areen, Government As Educator: A New Understanding of 
First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 981 
(2009) (arguing that Grutter “extended academic freedom beyond research and teaching to 
cover the kinds of academic matters embodied in the four essential freedoms.”). 
97 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Peter A. Joy, 
Government Interference with Law School Clinics and Access to Justice: When Is There a 
Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2011) (discussing these three cases 
and suggesting that “[w]hile the Garcetti Court appeared to signal that faculty teaching and 
scholarship were different than public employee speech and entitled to greater First 
Amendment protection, the circuit courts have not been so generous”). Joy also notes that 
some courts have attempted to insulate university decision-making from interference from 
state legislatures. Id. at 1097–98. 
98 Bishop, 926 F. 2d at 1075; see also FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 39 (“If the First 
Amendment protects the interests of individual persons to speak as they wish, academic 
freedom protects the interests of society in having a professoriat that can accomplish its 
mission.”). 	
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musicians have no First Amendment right to showcase their talents in a town hall 
meeting devoted to a local ballot initiative, so too can the classroom be restrictively 
focused on particular subject matter. 
On closer inspection, however, even the analogy to a limited public forum falls 
short. Suppose the physics professor insisted on teaching that magnetic fields were 
caused by invisible goblins rather than electromagnetic force. Neither principles of 
academic freedom nor the First Amendment would protect her ability to teach this 
perspective. Few people would be bothered by restrictions on the goblin-touting 
physics professor. But what about more controversial examples, like the science 
professor who rejects climate change, the medical school professor who advocates 
for or against sex reassignment surgeries, or the international relations professor who 
denies the sovereignty of Israel or Palestine?  
In the context of academic freedom, departing from First Amendment norms 
against viewpoint discrimination may leave controversial scholarly claims 
unprotected. And it is not clear at what point a particular claim moves from 
controversial to impermissible—or who gets to make that determination. Post and 
Finkin suggest that “the production of knowledge requires not merely the negative 
liberty to speculate free from censorship but also an affirmative commitment to the 
virtues of reason, fairness, and accuracy.”99 That commitment might work well in 
certain scientific inquiries, but its application in the humanities is far less clear. How, 
for example, can humanities scholars commit to the virtue of reason when at times 
the definition of reason itself is contested?100 Nor can Post and Finkin escape this 
puzzle by appealing to “compliance with professional norms” and “professional 
regulation.”101 As recent examples suggest, entire disciplines—or at least the key 
gatekeepers to disciplinary power—can be captured more by politicized viewpoints 
than “commitment to the virtues of reason, fairness, and accuracy.”102 
Focusing on the university’s purpose as a place of constrained disagreement 
can help address both these seemingly irresolvable tensions and the strains between 
individual faculty and institutional governance that arise under the umbrella of 																																																								
99 FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 42–43. 
100 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 
(1981) (arguing that forms of reason are based on tradition-dependent argumentative 
practices); STANLEY HAUERWAS, How to Be Theologically Funny, in THE WORK OF 
THEOLOGY (2015) (making a similar critique of “practical reason”). 
101 FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 43. 
102 See, e.g., Jose Luis Bermudez, Defining ‘Harm’ in the Tuvel Affair, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (May 5, 2017) (discussing the open letter against philosophy professor Rebecca Tuvel 
for her article exploring parallels between being transgender and being transracial) 
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2017/05/05/real-damage-done-flare-over-philosoph 
ers-journal-article-essay [https://perma.cc/ST8Q-EXGT]; Andrew Koppelman, Corrupting 
the National Book Award?, BALKINIZATION (October 26, 2017), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/10/corrupting-national-book-award.html [https://perma.cc 
/DV47-THA8] (critiquing the selection of Nancy MacClean’s Democracy in Chains: The 
Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America as a finalist for the National 
Book Award despite egregious and widely documented errors in the book). 
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academic freedom. Intelligibly warring creeds require a kind of structured discourse 
in the university and most especially in the classroom. That emphasis suggests that 
faculty have broad but not unfettered discretion to explore contested and 
controversial subjects and viewpoints. But constraint and intelligibility impose some 
limits. In some subjects, they might also place a greater responsibility on the 
classroom instructor to remember her primary role in facilitating constrained 
disagreement and warring creeds. Accepting this purpose of the university means 
that in the classroom, the instructor acts as teacher and facilitator more than activist 
and indoctrinator. That emphasis has implications for pedagogy, content selection, 
and broader curricular priorities. 
 
B.  Public Employee Speech 
 
A second issue at the intersection of the university’s purpose and its expressive 
limits is speech by university employees. Many members of a public university—
faculty, staff, administrators, and even some students—are also public employees 
subject to special restrictions on their speech and conduct.103 The framework for 
assessing these restrictions comes from the Supreme Court’s public employee 
speech cases.104 Unfortunately, these cases are themselves murky about the line 
between “public” and “private” speech by public employees and what kinds of topics 
qualify as matters of “public concern” sufficient to trigger additional employer 
restrictions. 
In the university context, courts have insufficiently defined the intersection 
between academic freedom and limits on public employee speech.105 For example, 
in Hong v. Grant, a federal district court held that a university professor was not 
entitled to First Amendment protection for remarks he made during promotion and 
hiring decisions.106 The court concluded that a public university’s internal staffing 
practices were of little public concern.107 But this singular attention to matters of 
public concern neglects other First Amendment values. For example, comments 
regarding promotion and hiring may be highly relevant to matters of academic 
freedom in ways that warrant greater rather than less First Amendment protection.  																																																								
103 See Papandrea, supra note 10, for a recent consideration of university students’ free 
speech rights generally. 
104 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). 
105 See Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine 
and Academic Speech After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1223 (2010) 
(“Professors must therefore proceed at their own risk when raising concerns about 
departmental matters and the self-governance process, as courts could view this speech as 
nothing more than employee grievances that fail to constitute a matter of public concern.”). 
106 Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 
236 (9th Cir. 2010). 
107 Id.  	
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Some courts have applied the framework for public employee speech to 
university students. In Marcum v. Dahl, the Tenth Circuit analogized student-
athletes to government employees.108 The case involved University of Oklahoma 
basketball team members who complained to their athletic director and the media 
about their head coach and subsequently lost their scholarships due to their “attitude 
and behavior.”109 The court concluded that the students were public employees and 
their comments did not involve matters of public concern.110  
Courts have also upheld expressive restrictions on students enrolled in 
professional and preprofessional programs.111 In Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected a First Amendment claim by Amanda 
Tatro, an undergraduate student enrolled in the University of Minnesota’s mortuary-
science program.112 Tatro had made several off-color Facebook posts about the 
cadavers she was dissecting.113 When these posts came to light, the university 
contended that Tatro had engaged in “unprofessional conduct.”114 School officials 
failed her in the class, placed her on probation for her remaining time at the 
university, required her to enroll in an ethics course, and mandated a psychiatric 
evaluation.115 The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the school’s decisions, 																																																								
108 Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1981). 
109 Id. at 733. 
110 Id. at 734; see also Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (D. Kan. 2005) 
(analyzing a University of Kansas track athlete’s claim under public employee speech 
doctrine and concluding that the student’s speech leading to his loss of athletic scholarship 
did not touch upon matters of public concern); see generally, James Hefferan, Picking Up 
the Flag? The University of Missouri Football Team and Whether Intercollegiate Student-
Athletes May Be Penalized for Exercising Their First Amendment Rights, 12 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 68 (2016) (exploring “whether intercollegiate student-
athletes may be penalized for exercising their First Amendment right to freedom of speech”). 
111 A professional school consists of coursework that prepares students for careers in 
specific fields. Although most of these are graduate-level programs, some schools also offer 
undergraduate degrees in specific professions. These are distinct from a traditional graduate 
school where students focus primarily on mastering a particular field of study and do not 
focus on training for a specific career. See CORNELL CAREER SERVICES, GRADUATE & 
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL, CORNELL UNIV. 1 (2016), https://www.career.cornell.edu/resources 
/upload/Graduate-School-Guide-16-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/39LJ-DRG]. 
112 Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on other 
grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
113 Id. at 814. Tatro commented that she “[r]ealized with great sadness that my best 
friend, Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to accompany him 
to the retort [sic]. Now where will I go or who will I hang with when I need to gather my 
sanity? Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket.” Id.  
114 Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012); see also Minn. Stat. § 
149A.70, subd. 7(3) (2010) (“[U]nprofessional conduct [of a mortician] includes the ‘failure 
to treat the body of the deceased’ or ‘the family or relatives of the deceased’ ‘with dignity 
and respect.’”). 
115 Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 815. 	
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concluding that Tatro’s “Facebook posts materially and substantially disrupted the 
work and discipline of the university . . . .”116  
Applying public employee speech to students raises several line-drawing 
questions. If public universities can regulate the speech and conduct of athletes and 
preprofessional students, then what about students on academic scholarships or 
those participating in work-study programs? And how far into students’ personal 
lives do these restrictions extend? These questions are not easily answered, but 
focusing on the university’s purpose might inform decisions about student and 
employee speech. Expression or expressive conduct in the service of constrained 
disagreement or intelligibly warring creeds might warrant heightened protection 
even when manifested within extracurricular rather than formally curricular 
contexts.  
 
C.  Public Forums 
 
Some of the most visible spaces for constrained disagreement on public 
university campuses are public forums—the government-managed spaces where 
people gather and express themselves.117 The government owns and manages these 
forums, but within those spaces, anyone can say almost anything.118 The ideal of the 
public forum reflects our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.”119 Yet this ideal faces 
practical constraints. 
The limits on First Amendment activity in a public forum fall under what the 
Court has called content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.120 The doctrine 																																																								
116 Id. at 822. In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that standards for online 
speech by students in secondary schools could be applied to pre-professional university 
students. Id. at 821; see also Keefe v. Adams, 44 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (D. Minn. 2014), 
aff’d, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016). 
117 See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST 
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 259–93 (2009) (explaining the history of political 
and social activism on university campuses and the characteristics of public universities that 
facilitate this activism). 
118 Speech that advocates imminent lawless action is prohibited. See Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state may not proscribe advocacy of the use 
of force “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action”). Certain “unprotected” categories of speech can also be restricted. See, e.g., Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that obscenity does not receive First 
Amendment protection because it is “utterly without redeeming social importance”). The 
limits on discourse in the public forum are otherwise minimal. 
119 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 270 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (referring to streets and parks as 
“quintessential public forums”). 
120 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable 	
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is far from clear; as Steven Shiffrin has suggested, “if content neutrality is the First 
Amendment emperor, the emperor has no clothes.”121 Content neutrality misses the 
expressive connection between a message and the time, place, and manner in which 
it occurs.  
The challenges of the public forum doctrine are even more pronounced within 
the varied spaces of a public university.122 Dormitories and classrooms are not the 
same as open public spaces.123 More generally, the university also differs from 
“quintessential public forums” like public streets and public parks.124 As one court 
has observed: 
 
[T]he purpose of a university is strikingly different from that of a public 
park. Its essential function is not to provide a forum for general public 
expression and assembly; rather, the university campus is an enclave 
created for the pursuit of higher learning by its admitted and registered 
students and by its faculty.125  
 
																																																								
time, place, or manner restrictions.”); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (“A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction 
is that the restriction ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.’” 
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980))). 
121 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 66 
(1999). 
122 See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A university campus 
will surely contain a wide variety of fora on its grounds.”); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 
976–77 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[L]abeling the campus as one single type of forum is an impossible, 
futile task.”); Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme 
Court’s forum analysis jurisprudence does not require us to choose between the polar 
extremes of treating an entire university campus as a forum designated for all types of speech 
by all speakers, or, alternatively, as a limited forum where any reasonable restriction on 
speech must be upheld.”); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F.Supp.2d 853, 860 (N.D. Tex. 2004) 
(noting that the “entire University campus is not a public forum subject to strict scrutiny,” 
but the “University, by express designation, may open up more of the residual campus as 
public forums for its students, but it can not designate less”).  
123 See generally Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
that a classroom is not the same as an open public space); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 
(11th Cir. 1991) (discussing that a classroom is not the same as an open public space); Bd. 
of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (discussing that a college 
dormitory is not the same as an open public space). 
124 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983). See also Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App’x 
501, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he great weight of authority . . . has rejected the notion that 
open areas on a public university campus are traditional public fora.”); Haragan, 346 F. 
Supp. 2d at 860 (The “entire University campus is not a public forum subject to strict 
scrutiny.”).  
125 Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1233–34. 	
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On the other hand, this broad characterization of the university does not insulate 
all spaces from expression. Campus space that is “physically indistinguishable from 
public sidewalks” or otherwise blends into noncampus areas can still qualify as a 
traditional public forum.126 But unlike a city park or street with clearly marked 
boundaries, the ambiguous borders of traditional public forums within public 
universities can sometimes create “an impermissible amount of doubt” for a 
potential speaker.127 This potential chilling effect has led at least two federal circuits 
to extend traditional forum analysis to spaces adjacent to sidewalks and open 
areas.128  
The unique context of the public university permits certain speaker-based 
distinctions that would be unavailable in traditional public forums.129 For example, 																																																								
126 See McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Because the perimeter 
sidewalks at [Tennessee Tech University] blend into the urban grid and are physically 
indistinguishable from public sidewalks, they constitute traditional public fora.”); Brister v. 
Faulkner, 214 F.3d 675, 683 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding “a unique piece of university property 
that is, for all constitutional purposes, indistinguishable from the Austin city sidewalk” to be 
a traditional public forum); Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding that the sidewalks surrounding a university’s campus are traditional public forums). 
But see Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1233–34 (“Even though GSU’s campus possesses many of the 
characteristics of a public forum—including open sidewalks, streets, and pedestrian malls—
it differs in many important ways from public streets or parks. Perhaps most important, the 
purpose of a university is strikingly different from that of a public park. . . . Nor is this case 
like [a case where the Supreme Court’s sidewalks] were indistinguishable from other public 
sidewalks in Washington, D.C., and, thus, constituted traditional public fora. Here, the 
sidewalks, Pedestrian Mall, and Rotunda are all contained inside of the GSU campus. All of 
the University’s entrances are identified with large blue signs and brick pillars, all of the 
buildings are identified with large blue signs, and all of its parking lots have signs restricting 
their use to GSU community members.” (internal citations omitted)). 
127 Brister, 214 F.3d at 682–83 (5th Cir. 2000) (“If individuals are left to guess whether 
they have crossed some invisible line between a public and non-public forum, and if that line 
divides two worlds—one in which they are free to engage in free speech, and another in 
which they can be held criminally liable for that speech—then there can be no doubt that 
some will be less likely to pursue their constitutional rights, even in the world where their 
speech would be protected.”). 
128 See id.; see also McGlone, 681 F.3d at 734–45 (finding requirements that potential 
speakers obtain advance permission to be an unconstitutional restriction on the evangelist’s 
free speech rights in a traditional public forum). 
129 Universities’ restrictions on speech can affect a range of actors including professors, 
administrators, staff, coaches, and others. See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated 
Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and 
Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 483 (2005) (citing Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 
F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2003) (students)); Besser v. Hardy, 260 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 970 (2002) (professors); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 
1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (coaches); Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 224 superseding 146 F.3d 
304 (5th Cir. 1998) (employees as consultants or expert witnesses); American Future Sys. v. 
Pa. State Univ., 618 F.2d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 1980) (vendors); American Future Sys. v. Pa. 	
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the Eleventh Circuit recently noted that an evangelist not associated with the 
university was “not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the 
forum was created,” and thus could be “constitutionally restricted from undertaking 
expressive conduct” on areas that the university opened for expressive speech by 
campus community members.130 The Eighth Circuit has also upheld permit 
requirements for nonuniversity speakers based on safety and space concerns.131 
Within the university context, we might return to the idea of constrained 
disagreement to think about limits on the public forum. When a university 
functionally treats a space as a public forum—a green space, walkway, or bridge 
that can be painted with messages—it triggers a high presumption against viewpoint 
discrimination. Even so, it can still impose time, place, and manner restrictions, and 
it can “manage” the forum to ensure that all voices have a reasonable opportunity to 
make their perspectives known. And unlike more traditional public forums, perhaps 
the university should also be able to impose restrictions against ad hominem attacks 
for the sake of facilitating constrained disagreement. That possibility raises a host of 
line-drawing challenges, and it may be that only certain spaces can be constrained 
in this way. But on the public university campus, perhaps not every open forum 
should be open in the same way. 
 
D.  Safe Spaces 
 
In recent years, debates have erupted over whether university students should 
have access to “safe spaces”—places on campus free from offensive and unsettling 
expression.132 Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt worry that some advocates of safe 
spaces seek to transform campuses into places “where young adults are shielded 
																																																								
State. Univ., 688 F.2d 907, 918 (3d Cir. 1982) (vendors); Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.—Purdue 
Univ. Fort Wayne, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (discussing the institution 
itself as speaker).  
130 Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1235. See also Students for Life USA v. Waldrop, 162 F. 
Supp. 3d 1216, 1224 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (“[T]he Court accepts that the Perimeter could 
theoretically be a designated public forum as to students despite being a limited public forum 
as to the general public.”).  
131 See Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 981 (8th Cir. 2006). The court found that a 
five-day cap on permits was not narrowly drawn to achieve an interest in “fostering a 
diversity of viewpoints and avoiding the monopolization of space” as, “the space will go 
unused even if Bowman still wants to use the space” after his five days are over. Id. at 981–
82. See also Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App’x 501, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding a student-
sponsorship requirement as applied to a campus evangelist).  
132 This section draws from Ashutosh Bhagwat & John Inazu, Searching for Safe 
Spaces, INSIDE HIGHER ED (March 21, 2017), https://www.highered.com/views/2017/03/21 
/easily-caricatured-safe-spaces-can-help-students-learn-essay [https://perma.cc/46DT-
55G7]. 	
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from words and ideas that make some uncomfortable.”133 Their concerns are not 
entirely unwarranted. In November 2016, following the election of Donald Trump, 
the University of Michigan Law School offered students “stress-busting self-care 
activities” that included coloring, blowing bubbles, and sculpting with Play-Doh.134 
A year earlier, student activists at the University of Missouri asked that reporters be 
denied access to their tent city “so the place where people live, fellowship, and sleep 
can be protected from twisted insincere narratives.”135 One Ivy League professor has 
even suggested that students should be provided “campus-wide, reflective, self-
aware distance from the grit of the everyday.”136  
The idea of a “campus-wide” safe space raises serious practical and theoretical 
concerns. But there are also dangers of overreacting with First Amendment bluster, 
or ridicule, as some right-leaning critics have done in deriding advocates for safe 
spaces as “snowflakes.”137 Proponents of safe spaces have some important 
arguments. In fact, we know from experience that people depend upon private and 
protected places to regroup, rest, and reenergize. We form our most intimate bonds 
and our deepest convictions outside of the public eye, with trusted friends, in spaces 
that might fairly be characterized as “safe.”  
The term “safe space” saw its first consistent usage with the 1960s and 1970s 
women’s movement, when it connoted “a means rather than an end and not only a 
physical space but a space created by the coming together of women searching for 
community.”138 Buttressed by developments in critical theory, Malcolm Harris 																																																								
133 Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-
coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ [https://perma.cc/4K9P-5C9R]. 
134 Emily Zanotti, University of Michigan cancels plan to help students “cope” with 




135 Conor Friedersdorf, Campus Activists Weaponize “Safe Space,” THE ATLANTIC 
(November 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/how-campus-
activists-are-weaponizing-the-safe-space/415080/ [https://perma.cc/5PXA-BZNF]. 
136 Matthew Pratt Guterl, On Safety and Safe Spaces, INSIDE HIGHER ED (August 29, 
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/08/29/students-deserve-safe-spaces-
campus-essay [https://perma.cc/BF8V-8HBZ]. 
137 Emily Jashinsky, Ben Shapiro, Adam Carolla Slam Campus Safe-Space Culture in 
Congressional Hearing, THE WASH. EXAMINER (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ben-shapiro-adam-carolla-slam-campus-safe-space-
culture-in-congressional-hearing [https://perma.cc/33F4-PTBZ] (quoting conservative 
activist Ben Shapiro as stating that safe space culture “turns students into snowflakes, craven, 
and pathetic”). 
138 Malcolm Harris, What’s a ‘Safe Space’? A Look at the Phrase’s 50-year History, 
FUSION (Nov. 11, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/231089/safe-space-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/3Y7F-PF8J]. Writing in a publication called Mind Hacks, an anonymous 
author challenged Harris’s account and argued that the concept of space spaces emerged not 	
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asserts, the push for safe spaces evolved by the early 2000s into arguments for 
“gender-neutral bathrooms, asking people’s preferred pronouns, trigger warnings, 
internal education ‘anti-oppression’ trainings, and creating separate auxiliary spaces 
for identity groups to organize their particular concerns.”139 
Of course, in a broader sense, the idea of places where like-minded groups 
could gather, organize, and seek mutual support long predates the formal use of “safe 
space.”140 Black churches sustained alternative communities and social movements 
through much of our nation’s history, from the antebellum era to the civil rights 
era.141 The suffragist movement grew out of women who gathered not only in 
conventions but also around teatimes, potato sack races, and pageants.142 Even 
taverns offered private meeting places in the lead up to the American Revolution.143  
The notion of a safe space builds on the idea that people develop intellectually 
and relationally not only from exposure to conflicting ideas but also from the 
protection of intimate and private settings. This principle is supported not only by 
common sense and history but also by an important strand of constitutional law that 
allows private citizens to form and participate in groups of their choosing. As Ken 
White has argued, “[s]afe spaces, if designed in a principled way, are just an 
application of [the freedom of association].”144 
The Constitution does not explicitly protect a freedom of association, but the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the right to associate, to organize, and to gather 
in groups with like-minded individuals as implicit in the First Amendment rights of 																																																								
from feminist and gay liberation movements but within corporate America through the work 
of psychologist Kurt Lewin. The Real History of the ‘Safe Space,’ MIND HACKS (Nov. 12, 
2015), https://mindhacks.com/2015/11/12/the-real-history-of-the-safe-space/ [https://perma. 
cc/JH2M-J6AV]. According to the Mind Hacks article, Lewin’s late 1940s work on the 
development of corporate leadership training laid a foundation for what came to be known 
as sensitivity training: “One of the ideas behind sensitivity training was that honesty and 
change would only occur if people could be frank and challenge others in an environment of 
psychological safety. In other words, without judgment . . . [a] ‘safe space’ is created.” Id. 
139 The Real History of the ‘Safe Space,’ supra note 138. 
140 See generally, JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY (2012) (examining the right of assembly and its importance for social movements 
like abolitionism, women’s suffrage, and the labor and civil rights movements).  
141 Judith Weisenfeld, Religion in African American History, in OXFORD RESEARCH 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, AMERICAN HISTORY (2015), http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10. 
1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-24#notes 
[https://perma.cc/Z2DE-N4W4]. 
142 INAZU, supra note 140, at 45. 
143 See Baylen J. Linnekin, “Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause: 
Tracing the First Amendment’s Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial Taverns, 39 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 593, 596 (2012). 
144 Ken White, Safe Spaces As Shield, Safe Spaces As Sword, POPEHAT (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://popehat.com/2015/11/09/safe-spaces-as-shield-safe-spaces-as-sword/ [https://perma. 
cc/RTB7-TS9L]. 	
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assembly and speech.145 In one of its earliest cases acknowledging the right of 
association, the Supreme Court noted that it is essential to the ability of individuals 
to develop and communicate their views.146 The Court has also recognized that the 
right to choose those with whom we associate—and to exclude from a group 
individuals who do not share the group’s beliefs—is a central aspect of 
association.147 The right to associate is the right to associate with individuals of one’s 
choice. When individuals form an association, they may exclude (and shield 
themselves from) opposing viewpoints. In many ways, a private association is a kind 
of safe space. 
The relationship between private associations and safe spaces takes on 
particular importance in the context of the residential college, which contains both 
sites of contested inquiry and places of intimate repose. The debate over safe spaces 
raises important questions about the nature of human interaction, the limits of free 
expression, and the role of the First Amendment in our civic practices. The 
emergence of these debates on college campuses is not simply a function of campus 
activism and progressive faculty. Rather, the nature of college campuses—including 
the people, places, and purposes that comprise them—creates an environment that 
illustrates both the limits and the possibilities of safe spaces.  
Undergraduates at the typical residential college spend most of their waking 
and sleeping hours on campus. Unlike faculty members, administrators, and 
graduate students, they do not have off-campus homes to which they can easily 
retreat during the school year. In this sense, residential colleges share similarities 
with other institutions like secondary schools, prisons, and military bases that 
present unique First Amendment challenges. The institution is neither an open public 
forum nor a wholly privatized space.  
Even the most vigorous academic proponents of open debate would not want 
their living rooms to become open forums for diverse viewpoint expression. Most 
people need to be able to retreat and rejuvenate in their homes and other intimate 
social settings. In these environments, they commune with like-minded friends, 
engage in informal interactions, and pursue mindless pastimes with no ideological 
content at all. In these settings, people rarely want to have to defend their deepest 
beliefs or confront hostility.  
There will, of course, be variations among campuses, both in what a “safe 
space” means and in a school’s willingness or ability to commit resources to this 
area. Even here, however, the First Amendment provides some guidance. Most 
notably, the Supreme Court in 1988 upheld a law banning sidewalk picketing 																																																								
145 INAZU, supra note 140, at 2–3. 
146 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
147 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (upholding the right of 
the Boy Scouts of America to expel a gay assistant scoutmaster). But see Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (rejecting associational claim of all-male civic 
organization). For a critical take on the tensions between Dale and Jaycees, see INAZU, supra 
note 140, at 10. 	
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directed at private residences, as applied to antiabortion protestors gathering on a 
public sidewalk in front of a physician’s home.148 In most settings, the First 
Amendment protects the right to speak and protest in public places. But the Court 
recognized that the interest in preserving “residential privacy” outweighed this 
general principle.149 This reasoning suggests that, at a minimum, residential 
universities are entirely justified in protecting intellectual and physical privacy in 
dormitories that function as students’ homes. 
Legitimate calls for privacy and intimacy are not, however, limited to the home. 
As the earlier discussion of the right of association suggests, people often foster their 
intellectual and emotional development within groups. But groups need private 
places to meet and deliberate. Students who spend their lives on campus need spaces 
on campus, and cramped dorm rooms are hardly adequate. Groups of like-minded 
students who wish to meet in private spaces on campus and limit attendance to those 
with whom they share values and beliefs are a core example of the need for strong 
associational protections. 
The debate over safe spaces is unlikely to end anytime soon. But situating that 
debate within the broader context of the university and the First Amendment pierces 
some of the partisan framing that suggests only one side or the other has any merit. 
Like the university itself, the safe space is a complex idea that, properly construed, 
can help students engage more fully in the pursuit of knowledge and dialogue across 
differences.  
 
E.  Religious Pluralism 
 
A final issue at the intersection of the First Amendment and the university is 
religious pluralism. The challenge of religious pluralism (which is related to the 
challenge of pluralism more generally) emerges out of the institutional history of the 
American university, which at its origins was pervasively Christian in nature.150 That 
was true not only for private universities like Harvard and Yale but also for the first 
public universities like the University of North Carolina. As historian George 
Marsden has suggested, “[u]nlike some other Western countries which addressed the 
problems of pluralism by encouraging multiple educational systems, the American 
tendency was to build what amounted to a monolithic and homogenous educational 
establishment and to force the alternatives to marginal existence on the 
periphery.”151  
As American universities and the broader society became more pluralistic, 
baseline assumptions about religion also changed.152 Marsden suggests that the 
																																																								
148 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988). 
149 Id. at 484. 
150 GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM 
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 3 (1994). 
151 Id. at 5. 
152 Id. at 4–5. 
974 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
	
move away from this religious baseline can be characterized in one of two ways, 
each with different implications: 
 
On the one hand, it is a story of the disestablishment of religion. On the 
other hand, it is a story of secularization. From the point of view of persons 
with wholly secular values, these two ways of characterizing the history 
may fit harmoniously, both being laudable . . . . For those who have 
religious commitments, on the other hand, “disestablishment” and 
“secularization” are likely to suggest opposed evaluations. 
Disestablishment is likely to sound like a good thing, while secularization, 
even if desirable in many of its forms, seems undesirable if it excludes 
religion from the major areas of public life that shape people’s 
sophisticated beliefs.153 
 
This dueling narrative describing the changing relationship between the American 
university and religion contextualizes contemporary challenges surrounding 
religious freedom in the university. 
One of the most important questions is the extent to which the university must 
include religious beliefs and viewpoints. The Supreme Court has been less than clear 
in approaching this question, initially signaling a commitment to robust religious 
pluralism but more recently suggesting that a different set of commitments might 
qualify or even nullify genuine religious pluralism.154  
In 1981, the Court addressed the question of whether public university funding 
should extend to student religious groups in Widmar.155 The case arose when the 
University of Missouri at Kansas City prohibited the use of buildings or grounds 
“for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”156 Members of a Christian 
student group contended that the regulation violated their free exercise and free 
speech rights.157 The university argued that the Establishment Clause required the 
regulation.158 The Supreme Court made clear that the balance of constitutional 
interests lay squarely in favor of the student group.159 Because the university had 
“created a forum generally open for use by student groups,” it had “assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms.”160 That obligation extended to religious groups even though 
it was “possible—perhaps even foreseeable—that religious groups will benefit from 																																																								
153 Id. at 6. 
154 Compare Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Va. 515 U.S. 819 (1995), and 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), with Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez 130 S. Ct. 
2971 (2010). 
155 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264–65 (1981). 
156 Id. at 265.  
157 Id at 266. 
158 Id. at 270.  
159 Id. at 276. 
160 Id. at 267. 	
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access to University facilities.”161 In fact, denying “access to the customary media 
for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students” 
would limit “the capacity of a group or individual ‘to participate in the intellectual 
give and take of campus debate.’”162 The Court concluded that the “exclusionary 
policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be 
content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards.”163 
Justice Stevens concurred separately. In his view, the majority’s public forum 
analysis would “needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public 
universities.”164 Stevens elaborated: 
 
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a 
university routinely make countless decisions based on the content of 
communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, 
they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they 
select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars 
for what they have written. In addition, in encouraging students to 
participate in extracurricular activities, they necessarily make decisions 
concerning the content of those activities.165 
 
Stevens’ argument stretches the notion of academic freedom beyond even that 
proposed by the AAUP.166 Under his view, little within the university falls outside 
the purview of academic freedom—or at least academic freedom for “the managers 
of a university,” many of whom are not themselves research and teaching faculty.167 
While the student petitioners in Widmar asserted both free exercise and free 
speech violations, the Supreme Court framed the case entirely around free speech 
doctrine. Fifteen years later, it reinforced this approach in Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of University of Virginia.168 In that case, the University of Virginia 
provided funding for student-run publications but withheld funds from a particular 
publication because it “primarily promote[d] or manifeste[d] a particular belie[f] in 
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”169 Using a free speech analysis, the Supreme 
Court rejected the university’s viewpoint discrimination, concluding that the 
purpose of the university’s funding scheme was “to encourage a diversity of views 																																																								
161 Id. at 273. 
162 Id. at 274 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972)). 
163 Id. at 277. 
164 Id. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
165 Id. at 278–79 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
166 See supra notes 75–77 (discussing AAUP’s approach to faculty-centered academic 
freedom). 
167 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
168 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
169 Id. at 834.  	
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from private speakers.”170 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion added that “[f]or the 
University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students 
risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers 
for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses.”171 
Widmar and Rosenberger both assert strong protections for religious pluralism, 
but both subsume any distinctive free exercise concerns into a monolithic free 
speech doctrine. Were this simply a doctrinal shift, religious pluralism might remain 
viable in the university under a different name. But the Court’s more recent 
consideration of these issues suggests otherwise. In 2010, Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez172 upheld Hastings College of the Law’s “all comers” policy that required 
all student groups to accept any student as a member. 173 Hastings denied official 
recognition to a Christian Legal Society (CLS) student chapter because the group 
limited membership and leadership on the basis of sexual conduct and religious 
belief, in violation of the school’s policy.174 In addition to withholding modest 
funding and the use of its logo, Hastings denied the CLS chapter the opportunity to 
send mass e-mails to the student body, to participate in the annual student 
organizations fair, and to reserve on-campus meeting spaces.175 CLS filed suit in 
federal district court asserting violations of expressive association and free 
speech.176 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a five-justice majority applied a speech-based 
public forum analysis and concluded that the all-comers policy was “a reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum.” 177 In fact, 
according to Justice Ginsburg, the policy was “textbook viewpoint neutral” because 
it applied equally to all groups.178 Yet elsewhere in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
noted approvingly that Hastings’ all-comers policy “encourages tolerance, 
cooperation, and learning among students”179 and “conveys the Law School’s 
decision ‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which 
the people of California disapprove.’”180 These normative assertions sound like 																																																								
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 836. 
172 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). The discussion in this section draws from John D. Inazu, 
The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 821–23 
(2014). 
173 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (2010). 
174 Id. at 2980. 
175 See id. at 2979. 
176 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. May 19, 2006).  
177 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978. Justice Ginsburg somewhat controversially concluded 
that the rights of speech and association “merged” in this case. Id. at 2985. 
178 Id. at 2993. 
179 Id. at 2990. 
180 Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 35, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)). 	
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Justice Ginsburg was attempting to justify Hastings’ policy under a government 
speech rationale. But the assertions are not “textbook viewpoint neutral.”181 And 
they are at odds with “Hastings’ proclaimed policy of fostering a diversity of 
viewpoints among registered student groups.”182  
If Justice Ginsburg is correct that there can be no clearer case of content 
neutrality than an all-comers policy, it is difficult to see how a commitment to 
religious pluralism survives in the university context. A great number of religious 
groups hold exclusive truth claims and require their adherents to affirm those claims. 
Their approach to membership and leadership is fundamentally incompatible with 




Issues of academic freedom, public employee speech, public forums, safe 
spaces, and religious pluralism highlight the intersection of the First Amendment 
and the university as a place of constrained disagreement and intelligibly warring 
creeds. Viewing these questions through this lens can also remind us of the 
university’s limits. Wellmon drives home this point in his reflection on the 
University of Virginia’s uninspired response to white supremacists: 
 
The university has moral limitations. Universities cannot impart 
comprehensive visions of the good. They cannot provide ultimate moral 
ends. Their goods are proximate. Faculty members, myself included, need 
to acknowledge that most university leaders lack the language and moral 
imagination to confront evils such as white supremacy. They lack those 
things not because of who they are, but, as Weber argued, because of what 
the modern research university has become. Such an acknowledgment is 
also part of the moral clarity that we can offer to ourselves and to our 
students. We have goods to offer, but they are not ultimate goods.184  																																																								
181 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993. 
182 Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 3013 (“The RSO forum ‘seeks to 
promote a diversity of viewpoints among registered student organizations, including 
viewpoints on religion and human sexuality.’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 216)). 
183 I have argued elsewhere that a better approach to the generally available funding 
and facilities for privately organized student groups is to let students decide the contours and 
compositions of their groups. JOHN INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND 
THRIVING THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE 79–80 (2016). 
184 Wellmon, Moral Clarity, supra note 1. The university’s proximate goods can still 
undergird a coherent response to the Klan and the Neo-Nazis. See Chad Wellmon, After the 
University, Long Live the Academy!, CHAD WELLMON BLOG (October 26, 2017), 
https://chadwellmon.com/2017/10/26/after-the-university-long-live-the-academy/ 
[https://perma.cc/RK52-PHFT] (“[The Academy’s] epistemic practices and virtues entail a 
commitment to the moral dignity and equality of persons . . . . And so when 400 hundred 
white supremacists marched across my back yard and across the Lawn at the University of 	
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Recognizing the limits of the goods of the university can also remind the university 
and its leaders of the need “to look outside themselves and partner with other moral 
traditions and civic communities.”185 At the same time, universities remain 
“uniquely positioned to help students engage in open debates and conversations 
about the values they hold most dear.”186 It is not that the goods of the university do 
not matter—they matter a great deal. The university can only take us so far, but we 
still need it to take us there.  
If the university could be a place for MacIntyre’s constrained disagreement and 
Murray’s intelligibly warring creeds, it could help initiate students into the kind of 
conflict through which they learn to live together rather than fracture through 
indifference, apathy, or violence. Students and faculty could push each other toward 
a more generous dialogue across difference and wrestle with difficult concepts 
without giving up on one another. This country, now as much as ever, needs such 
places. Citizens of the university are also citizens of a much larger political project, 
where the stakes are much higher, the differences much starker, and the possibilities 
for dialogue often much smaller. The vision of the First Amendment is ultimately 
not just a vision for the university, but a vision for this broader political endeavor. 
And the university confident in its purpose, and cognizant of its limits, might be just 
the place to begin. 
																																																								
Virginia chanting: Jews Will Not Replace Us and White Lives Matter with tiki torches, they 
claimed that the young women of color in my class didn’t belong there; they claimed that 
my Jewish students who come visit me in office hours didn’t belong there. They denied their 
very capacity to participate in The Academy, to be formed by its practices, and to share in 
its goods. And so members of The Academy can and should denounce the neo-Nazis and 
white supremacists who marched on the Lawn at the University of Virginia because they are 
an affront to the ethics of The Academy.”). 
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